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This issue of Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is devoted to the topic of legal 
interpretation and legal reasoning. We believe that the legal field constitutes a 
privileged perspective from which to observe interpretative practice. As 
Stephen Toulmin points out, “lawsuits are just a special kind of rational 
dispute, for which the procedures and rules of argument have hardened into 
institutions.” (1) This point is also stressed by Neil MacCormick, who observes 
that legal interpretation “is perhaps a uniquely public and published form of 
reasoning, and therefore a resource of great potential interest to philosophers.” 
(2) 
This very fact, i.e. that legal interpretation is often public and published, facili-
tates the identification of interpretation’s rules and techniques as well as the 
singling out of philosophical questions concerning the practice of interpreting. 
The papers collected here meet some – the most central – of these questions.  
This introduction aims briefly to show the philosophical relevance of legal in-
terpretation and to distinguish the main perspectives of legal interpretation in 
the contemporary debate. 
 
 
1. An outline of interpretation in general 
 
“Interpretation” is not a practice concerning only the law. We can interpret a 
novel, a painting, a speech, a symphony, human conduct and many other 
things. Thus, it is wise to specify the general meaning of the word ‘interpreta-
tion’.  
A common definition is the following: ‘to interpret’ means to award a meaning 
to an ens (an entity) (like a novel, a statute and so on) which needs an ascription 
of meaning. (3) In the words of Michael S. Moore, interpretation “is the activity 
we engage in when we are trying to find the meaning of something.” (4)  
Of course, starting from this general definition, we need to distinguish different 
kinds of interpretation depending on the domain we are concerned with. For 
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example, it is obvious that interpreting a political speech is not exactly the 
same as interpreting a facial expression. Anyway, before dealing with the theme 
we are interested in, that of legal interpretation, and before introducing the spe-
cific characteristics of interpretation in the legal field, I wish to stress that the 
word ‘interpretation’, at least in the case of textual interpretation, is often used 
in two senses: it means either the activity of establishing the meaning of some 
documents, or the result or the product of this activity; in other words, the 
meaning itself. So, it is also common and appropriate to distinguish between in-
terpretation/activity and interpretation/product. (5) 
It is possible to sum up these general observations in three points:  
1)  there is a concept of interpretation which underpins all the possible mean-
ings of  the term in different domains. (6) 
2)  Interpretation is always interpretation of something (a human practice, a 
novel, a work of art, a statute and so on); so it is possible to add that ‘interpre-
tation’ identifies a relationship between three elements: a) the intention of the 
author of something (for example, what Shakespeare intended to communicate 
writing Hamlet); b) the meaning of the object of the interpretation quite apart 
from the intention of its author (what Hamlet communicates to us apart from 
Shakespeare’s own intentions); c) the intention of the interpreter himself (two 
different readers of Hamlet could find partly different meanings in it). (7) 
3) The word ‘interpretation’ refers both to the act of interpreting and to the 
product of interpretation. 
 
 
2. Interpretation and law 
 
In the previous paragraph I said that “interpretation is always interpretation of 
something.” In the present case, it means that, before speaking of legal inter-
pretation, we should determine what the object of this particular kind of inter-
pretation is; in other words, we should determine what the law is.  
As can easily be guessed, there is not a univocal answer to this question. As 
Hart observes “few questions concerning human society have been asked with 
such persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many diverse, strange, 
and even paradoxical ways as the question ‘What is law?’” (8) 
Running the risk of oversimplifying, we can assume – for the purposes of these 
introductory remarks only – that the law is a system of norms (rules or princi-
ples). (9) Consequently, legal interpretation is, chiefly, interpretation of norms. 
(10) 
But what is a norm? It is, first of all, a linguistic formulation. More precisely, it 
is, more often than not (at least, in the contemporary western legal systems), a 
written linguistic formulation. Thus the main object of legal interpretation is 
language. To specify what a language is, it is useful to distinguish between signs 
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and symbols. A sign is something natural; a symbol is an artificial product of 
human beings. For example, the ground being damp is a sign of a recent rain-
storm, while the red traffic light is a symbol that you have to stop. Symbols are 
conventional: we (i.e. all the members of a linguistic community) decide their 
meaning. The fact that we have to stop when the light is red is just a conven-
tion. As Alf Ross, the most prominent among Scandinavian legal realists, points 
out, a language is the most highly developed, most efficacious and most com-
plex system of symbols. (11) 
Thus some difficulties (perhaps the main ones) in legal interpretation are linked 
to some characteristics peculiar to language, in particular, vagueness and ambi-
guity. (12) 
A word is vague if its reference is indeterminate or, more exactly, under-
determinate. (13) In the case of vagueness, there is a central core in which the 
word clearly applies, and an area of uncertainty concerning the possible uses of 
the word in particular conditions. Herbert Hart gives the following example. 
There is a legal norm saying: “No vehicles in the park”; clearly, this norm for-
bids the entrance of cars in the park, but does it also forbid the entrance of bi-
cycles, people skating, kiddy cars and ambulances? This is not clear, just be-
cause the term ‘vehicle’ is a vague one. Another classical example of a vague 
term is ‘bald’. A person without hair is certainly bald, but there are cases in 
which it is not clear if a person is bald or not. 
A word is ambiguous when it has more than one referent. For example, the 
word ‘bank’ refers either to the place where we deposit our money, or to the 
edge of a river. 
Of course, many potential interpretative problems linked to ambiguity can eas-
ily be worked out by looking at words in their context (for example, in the sen-
tence “today a robber held up the Bank of Italy”, it is clear that the meaning of 
the word ‘bank’ is the first one and not the second). But when ambiguity is 
something more complex than mere homonymy, looking at the context may 
not suffice. Let us think, for example, of the different meanings of the word ‘in-
terpretation’ itself that we have already noticed. ‘Interpretation’ means either 
the activity of interpreting or the product of this activity and these meanings 
are so closely linked that looking at the context may not be sufficient for choos-
ing the first or the second one. 
Thus there are interpretative problems that are not easy to solve. With regard 
to the legal field, it is worth noticing at least the major presence of vague terms; 
one thinks of words or expressions like ‘reasonable’, ‘the common sense of de-
cency’, ‘good faith’ and so on. 
In this connection, it is possible to say that the object of legal interpretation is 
not so different from the object of literary interpretation. In the final analysis, 
Hamlet and a legal statute are both made up of words and propositions.  
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On the other hand, in spite of the fact that many legal theorists, for example 
Ronald Dworkin, emphasise the similarities among legal and literary interpre-
tation, there are also important differences. The main one is linked to the very 
function of the law. The law fulfils a practical function, that of regulating social 
life, by prescribing or prohibiting given conducts. For that reason, legal inter-
pretation is not an end in itself, but it is instrumental to the application of a 
general norm to a concrete case. It means that legal interpreters, in particular 
judges, have to choose just one of the many possible interpretations of a norm 
or a statute. This is not necessarily the case in literary interpretation. For ex-
ample, a literary critic is not forced to say that the best interpretation of Ham-
let is that of considering it as a political tragedy or a tragedy about death; he is 
allowed to accept both interpretations of the tragedy. On the contrary, a judge 
cannot say that that the word ‘vehicles’ in the previous example can be inter-
preted as referring only to cars or as referring to cars, bicycles, people skating, 
kiddie cars and ambulances, but has to make a choice between these rival inter-
pretations. 
To sum up: 
1) the object of legal interpretation is, by definition, the law; 
2) it is possible to describe the law as a system of rules or norms; 
3) norms are written linguistic expressions; so, 
4) language is the object either of legal interpretation or of literary interpre-
tation; 
5) this means that these two kinds of interpretation share some linguistic 
problems, like vagueness and ambiguity of words; 
6) on the other hand, the legal interpreter, unlike the literary interpreter, is 
forced to choose among the various possible interpretations.  
 
 
3. Interpretative formalism vs. interpretative anti-formalism 
 
On the basis of previous clarifications, it is possible to distinguish two conflict-
ing perspectives in legal interpretation: formalism and anti-formalism. Quoting 
again from Hart’s work, “Formalism and rule-scepticism are the Scylla and 
Charybdis of juristic theory; they are great exaggerations, salutary where they 
correct each other, and the truth lies between them.” (14) 
Interpretative formalism was popular in the 19th century, especially in France 
and Germany, after codification. The underpinning idea of formalism was that 
the only legal source was legislation, which shows the intention of a rational leg-
islator. Here there is the evident trust in reason typical of the Enlightenment. 
Legal codes were considered precise, exhaustive and consistent, and so the job 
of judges and legal interpreters in general was reduced to identifying the rules 
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contained in the code. According to the celebrated claim by Montesquieu, “Les 
juges ne sont que la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi.” (15) 
I said earlier that interpretation identifies a relationship between three ele-
ments: the intention of the author of a text, the meaning of the text itself, quite 
apart from the intention of its author and, finally, the intention of the inter-
preter. Interpretative formalism reduces interpretation to the first two of these 
elements. The task of the interpreter is a mechanical one: he should only cor-
rectly understand the meaning of a legal text. In other words, according to in-
terpretative formalism, the meaning of a norm is not the product of interpreta-
tion, but comes before the interpretation itself. The interpreter merely repeats 
the legislator’s will. According to formalism, the model of legal reasoning is that 
of deductive logic. In logic, the conclusion is already implied by the premises. 
The best-known example is syllogism. For example, if we say “All human be-
ings are mortal” (major premise); “Socrates is a human being” (minor premise), 
we must conclude that Socrates is mortal. But that conclusion adds nothing to 
the premises; it only renders explicit information already implicitly included in 
the premises. The logic of legal reasoning could be formalized in this way: we 
have a major premise like “if p, then q” (for example, if someone does not stop 
his car when the light is red, then he must pay a fine), then we have the minor 
premise “is the case that p” (that is, someone actually does not stop his car 
when the light is red), so the conclusion will be “q” (that is, X must pay a fine). 
The problem, which formalism underestimates, is that it is the interpreter, in 
the last analysis, that sets out the correct premises.  
Indeed, according to formalism, gaps and antinomies in the law are only appar-
ent, because the law itself offers criteria, like, for example, analogy, for going 
beyond these difficulties. Moreover, interpretative formalism believes that 
vagueness and ambiguity are vices that are completely absent in the law. In 
this way, formalism tries to preserve the well-known ideal of certainty of the 
law. If the law comes before interpretation, then everybody can know in ad-
vance what is required by the law. 
By contrast, interpretative anti-formalism maintains the thesis that there are 
no constraints at all on judges when they decide a judicial case. This theory pre-
supposes a sort of interpretative scepticism which could well be summarized by 
the following dialogue: “– ‘I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,”’ Alice said. 
– Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‘Of course you don’t’ -- till I tell 
you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’ – ‘But “glory” 
doesn’t mean “a nice knock-down argument,”’ Alice objected. – ‘When I use a 
word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I 
choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.’ – ‘The question is,’ said Alice, 
‘whether you CAN make words mean so many different things.’ – ‘The question 
is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master - - that’s all.’” (16) 
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Thus interpretative anti-formalism in the legal field presupposes a kind of rules 
and/or fact scepticism: rules are too general, vague and ambiguous for clearly 
directing the task of judging. Facts which judges have to subsume under a norm 
are elusive, so they can discretionarily establish every time whether a specific 
fact can be considered proven. The anti-formalists treat the ideal of “doing jus-
tice according to law” as a mere fiction and reduce the law to what judges do in 
the courts.  
Jerome Frank, an anti-formalist American judge of the first half of the last cen-
tury, expressed the most radical and intriguing form of interpretative scepti-
cism in his book Law and the Modern Mind “in which the belief that there could 
be legal rules binding on judges and applied by them, not made by them, in 
concrete cases is stigmatized as an immature form of fetishism or father fixation 
calling for psychoanalytical therapy.” (17) Frank expresses his claim without 
circumlocution: “whenever a judge decides a case he is making law: the law of 
that case, not the law of future cases not yet before him. What the judge does 
and what he says may somewhat influence what other judges will do or say in 
other cases. But what the other judges decide in those other cases, as a result of 
whatever influences, will be the law in those other cases. The law of any case is 
what the judge decides”. (18) 
Thus judges decide judicial cases on the ground of their own idea of justice, 
their mood, their favour for one or for the other of the parties involved in litiga-
tion and so on. Only after having decided in this way do judges find some legal 
justification (like a rule, a judicial precedent, a legal principle) to back up their 
decisions. In a nutshell, anti-formalism, excluding the intention of the author of 
the text and the meaning of the text itself, reduces interpretation to the third 
element, that is to say to the intention of the interpreter.  
Of course, there are also less radical versions of anti-formalism. The best-known 
is perhaps that of Alf Ross. According to Ross, the work of judging is the out-
come of a parallelogram of forces whose main vectors are formal legal con-
science and material legal conscience. In brief, a legal decision is a combination 
of a cognitive interpretation of the law and of an evaluative attitude of judges. 
Thus norms alone cannot determine a legal decision, though they contribute to 
it. They can only help us to predict what the judges will do in deciding a case. 
(19) 
 
4. The “interpretative turn”  
 
Contemporary legal thought has developed the awareness that legal practice is 
essentially an interpretative practice. In brief, this interpretative turn (20) 
means that it is no longer possible to sharply distinguish a theory on the nature 
of law from a theory on legal interpretation. This intuition is very well ex-
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pressed by Neil MacCormick: “a satisfactory theory of legal reasoning indeed 
requires and is required by a satisfactory theory of law.” (21) 
Moreover, the most interesting contemporary theories of legal interpretation, 
intentionally or unintentionally following Hart’s lesson, try to find a path be-
tween formalism and anti-formalism.  
In this section, I will try to elucidate both these characteristics of contemporary 
theories of legal interpretation by briefly showing Ronald Dworkin’s conception 
of legal interpretation. Dworkin’s thought, indeed, is probably the most cele-
brated expression of this mainstream of thinking.  
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin’s most important book on jurisprudence, it is possi-
ble to find a kind of manifesto supporting the interpretative turn: “I shall argue 
that legal practice is an exercise in interpretation not only when lawyers inter-
pret particular documents or statutes but generally. Law so conceived is deeply 
and thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad 
sense of political theory. But law is not a matter of partisan politics, and a cri-
tique of law that does not understand the difference will provide poor under-
standing and even poorer guidance.” (22) 
With this clear idea in mind, Dworkin distinguishes three different conceptions 
of law and of legal interpretation: 1) conventionalism, 2) legal pragmatism and his 
own conception 3) law as integrity.  
According to conventionalism (to which Dworkin erroneously assimilates Hart’s 
legal theory), “The law is the law. It is not what the judges think it is, but what 
it really is. Their job is to apply it, not to change it to fit their own ethics or 
politics.”(23) Moreover, when judges face cases not expressly covered by exist-
ing statutes, they “must decide such novel cases as best they can, but by hy-
pothesis no party has any right to win flowing from past collective decisions - 
no party has a legal right to win - because the only rights of that character are 
those established by convention. So the decision a judge must make in hard 
cases is discretionary in this strong sense: it is left open by the correct under-
standing of past decisions.” (24) 
In conclusion, Dworkin considers conventionalism a revisited form of interpre-
tative formalism. It distinguishes two different interpretative practices for easy 
and hard cases respectively. In easy cases, judges have to apply the law in a 
mechanical way. In hard ones, there are no constraints at all on judges, so they 
do not apply pre-existing law, but are completely free to decide what they pre-
fer. In this latter case, judges act as legislators, exercising strong discretion. 
Pragmatism is a revised form of an anti-formalist theory. Pragmatists are not 
interested in legal tradition at all and, moreover, they think it would be possible 
to go beyond tradition in the name of a positive change for society. On pragma-
tism Dworkin adds: “The pragmatist takes a sceptical attitude toward the as-
sumption we are assuming is embodied in the concept of law: he denies that 
past political decisions in themselves provide any justification for either using 
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or withholding the state's coercive power. He finds the necessary justification 
for coercion in the justice or efficiency or some other contemporary virtue of the 
coercive decision itself, as and when it is made by judges, and he adds that con-
sistency with any past legislative or judicial decision does not in principle con-
tribute to the justice or virtue of any present one. If judges are guided by this 
advice, he believes, then unless they make great mistakes, the coercion they di-
rect will make the community's future brighter, liberated from the dead hand of 
the past and the fetish of consistency for its own sake.” (25) 
Dworkin strongly contrasts this way of thinking, arguing that “civilization is 
impossible unless the decisions of some well-defined person or group are ac-
cepted by everyone as setting public standards that will be enforced if necessary 
through the police power. (...) If judges were seen to pick and choose among leg-
islation, enforcing only those statutes they approved, this would defeat the 
pragmatist’s goal because it would make things not better but much worse.” 
(26) 
In conclusion, by definition interpretation does not have a big role to play in a 
sceptical approach to law; the fact is that the task of judges is not to find a so-
lution which the law permits, but to create the best solution for the case in hand. 
In other words, pragmatism is built on the political conviction that only by 
treating each case in an individual way is it possible to ensure justice and/or ef-
ficiency. 
Introducing the concept of integrity, Dworkin aims to build a theory of law 
placed in between conventionalism and pragmatism. Dworkin’s ambition is to 
ensure an important place either for the requirement of fidelity to the law 
promulgated, or for the needs of justice. According to Dworkin, the interpreta-
tion of the law constitutes, in a way that is not trivial, the law. In “Is There 
Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?”, an essay collected in A Matter of 
Principle, Dworkin shows very clearly his thought about the relations between 
law and interpretation: “It is open for a lawyer to argue, as I have myself, that 
the impact of the statute on the law is determined by asking which interpreta-
tion, of the different interpretations admitted by abstract meaning of the term, 
best advances the set of principles and policies that provides the best political 
justification for the statute at the time it was passed. Or it is open to him to ar-
gue the much more conservative position that if a statute was vague it must be 
taken to have changed the legal status quo ante only the extent justified by the 
indisputable core of the language employed.” (27) 
The challenge of the interpretative turn in legal interpretation is that of finding 
a suitable balance between the demands of certainty and those of flexibility.  
Law as integrity is an attempt to face this challenge: “Law as integrity denies 
that statements of law are either the backward-looking factual reports of con-
ventionalism or the forward-looking instrumental programs of legal pragma-
tism. It insists that legal claims are interpretative judgements and therefore 
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combine backward- and forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary 
legal practice seen as an unfolding political narrative. So law as integrity rejects 
as unhelpful the ancient question whether judges find or invent law; we under-
stand legal reasoning, it suggests, only by seeing the sense in which they do 
both and neither.” (28)  
The risk is the sceptical drift implied by the challenge of the interpretative turn, 
as is clearly pointed out by Michel Rosenfeld in the concluding remarks of Just 
Interpretations: “In sum, all intersubjective meaning is derived by interpreta-
tion, and law, ethics, and politics…are at bottom but interpretation. At the 
end, the best we can do is to aim at a justice that depends on interpretation. 
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